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HAPPINESS AND REVEALED PREFERENCES IN
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
Richard A. Epstein*"
INTRODUCTION

How do we understand human nature? The purpose of this Essay is to
examine the relationship between human nature and social institutions.
More concretely, the question is: What does an accurate account of human
nature tell us about the choice of a desirable set of social institutions?
Accounts of this sort typically focus on two key sticking points, one of ends
and the other of means. On the former, Is individual self-interest the driving
force behind all forms of human behavior? Do people care about
themselves first? In the extreme, improbable, answer to this query, ordinary
people do not care about any other individuals at all. In more modest
versions, they display a degree of empathy and concern for their fellow
individuals, best captured by Hume's memorable phrase of "confin'd
generosity."' On the latter, Do these (self-interested) persons select the
proper, i.e., lowest cost, means to reach their chosen ends under conditions
of uncertainty?
Within the standard versions of neoclassical economics, both of these
premises-self-interest and rationality-are generally posited as true.2
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, and visiting professor, New York
University Law School.
t I should like to thank the participants of the Cardozo Law School faculty workshop for
their comments on an earlier draft of this Essay, and to Paul Shupack for his comments on the text. I
should also like to thank my research assistant, Uzair Kayani, University of Chicago Law School, Class
of 2009, for his usual excellent help preparing this Essay.
1. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 519 (P.H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1978) (1740). "Men being naturally selfish, or endow'd only with a confin'd generosity, they are not
easily induced to perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some reciprocal
advantage, which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a performance." Id Note that Hume uses
the phrase "not easily induced," which shows that he does not believe that such actions will never
happen. But the clear implication is that the gains to the recipient have to be far larger than the costs of
the other side for this action to take place. The patterns of altruism are indeed quite complex. David
Hyman has assembled an impressive array of evidence to indicate that in many cases there are too many
good Samaritans who perish in unsuccessful rescues. See David A. Hyman, Rescue without Law: An
EmpiricalPerspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEXAS L. REV. 653, 681 (2006) ("[l]ndividuals who
choose to get involved in a rescue face a significant risk of injury or death.").
2. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 10 (Philadelphia, Anthony
Finley 1817) (1759) (explaining the "[p]leasure of mutual [s]ympathy"). Smith states:
[N]othing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the
emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance
of the contrary. Those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain
refinements of self-love, think themselves at no loss to account, according to their
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Starting from these assumptions, the key challenge is to devise a set of
social constraints that align individual welfare with social welfare, which in
classical liberal theory leads to a prohibition against the use of force and
fraud and a strong suspicion of private monopoly. It then becomes possible
to develop a model of political institutions that promotes both private
property and voluntary agreements. These institutions are not selfsustaining, so the complete theory requires the creation of public
institutions with limited power to use tax revenues to develop additional
rules to promote the desirable and limit the undesirable behavior, as
identified under this basic theory.
I shall not seek here to offer a fresh defense of this view, which I have
long held.3 But I do want to deal with some of the critical attacks that have
sought to undermine its twin bedrock assumptions of self-interest and
individual rationality. A decade ago, perhaps, the dominant focus was on the
postulate of rational behavior, chiefly by exposing an array of cognitive
biases, starting with the early work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
More recently, academic attention has turned to the second key assumption
that asks whether the promotion of individual happiness counts as a proper or
useful social end. My purpose is not to defend the undying correctness of that
model of human behavior, in which individuals seek in systematic, relentless,
and precise fashion to maximize their individual welfare. It is rather to offer a
sympathetic but critical evaluation of this worldview in terms of evolutionary
theory, which, when properly understood, bolsters the case for the classical
liberal synthesis of legal norms and institutions. The connection between
evolution and political thought dates back to early times. Long before
Darwin, some implicit version of evolutionary theory was tied to now-oftdiscredited notions of "natural law," one of which refers to the rules of
conduct needed to protect basic human needs on such vital matters as
procreation, cooperation, and aggression.5
own principles, both for this pleasure and this pain.... But... it seems evident that
neither of them can be derived from any such self-interested consideration.
Id.
3.

See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL

LIBERALISM 34 (2003) (explaining why a sound theory of limited government, unlike the hard-line
libertarian position, allows for both flat taxes and the use of the eminent-domain power).
4. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3, 3 (Daniel Kalmeman et al. eds., 1982) (showing that
"people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations"); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979)
(describing "several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms
of expected utility theory").
5. See, e.g., JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES § 1.1 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., 1987): "The
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In order to achieve this result, Part I of this Essay briefly outlines the
general findings of the modem literature on two key elements of happiness.
The first is the weak correlation between happiness and other factors such
as wealth, health, exposure to potential criminal behavior, and other aspects
of human endeavor that we intuitively think affect people's sense of their
own well-being. The second is the persistent finding that individual
happiness is often relative, not absolute, such that people feel better off
when they perceive that people in their reference group are made worse off.
Part II then offers some common-sense reasons to question these
conclusions based on the observation of individual and group conduct. The
critique rests less on sophisticated reexamination of the extensive survey
data and more on the traditional emphasis on revealed preferences, which
insists that the most accurate guide to what people want lies not in what
they say, but what they do.
Part III then seeks to find the middle path whereby evolutionary theory
offers good reason to believe that both the survey data and the commonsense observation of human behavior are both needed to complete the
overall picture. In dealing with this information, it is necessary to
interweave three key facets of evolutionary theory: variability, inclusive
fitness, endogeneity.
First, on variability:a simple reminder that any theory of human nature
must take into account not only the behavior of the median individual, but
also variations within populations. Just as all individuals do not have the
same height or intelligence, they also do not have the same attitudes
towards their own happiness or that of others-let alone the same degree of
sociability. Taking these variations into account is critical for any
assessment of human behavior and the institutions that help shape it.
Second, on inclusive fitness: a shortfall of the happiness literature is
that it fails to take into account one of the central features of evolutionary
theory, namely, that individuals do not have individual welfare functions at
all. The more accurate account of human nature always stresses the key
notion of "inclusive fitness," which explains how each individual
necessarily takes into account the welfare of other individuals in making his

commandments of the law are these: live honourably; harm nobody; give everyone his due." Of these,
the second invokes the law of tort; the third, the law of contract. The first is the most ambiguous,
because there is little that law, as opposed to social norms, can do to enforce honorable behavior. If, for
example, not lying counts as honorable behavior, then the first prohibition adds nothing to the second. If
more is required, it is hard to see what law can do to compel it.
The next passage addresses the relationship between nature and natural law: "The law of
nature is the law instilled by nature in all creatures. It is not merely for mankind but for all creatures of
the sky, earth and sea. From it comes intercourse between male and female .... Id.§ 1.2.
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or her decisions.6 The relevant variables are easy to state. It is critical to ask
at what cost one person can give assistance to another with whom he or she
shares common genes. For parents, particularly mothers and infants,
extensive care makes good sense at the early stages in the relationship. So
long as the gains to the child are two times or more than costs to the parent,
the actions will be both offered by the parent and accepted by the child. But
let the cost to the parent be twice the benefit to the child, and neither party
will want that relationship to go forward. The conflicted situations arise
when the level of gain to the child is between one and two times the cost to
the parents, at which point the child will want the parent to continue the
action that the parent would prefer to cease. 7 Weaning is one obvious
illustration of this pattern of gradual separation. The actual distribution of
benefits and costs could well be culturally determined, but the relevance of
these ratios should be invariant across cultures. To be sure, we can identify
many situations, such as arm's-length transactions with strangers, where
none of these complications alter the basic results. The family situation only
determines that the distribution of the gains (or losses) of these transactions
with strangers will be distributed within the family. Lawyers often refer to
this as "natural love and affection. ' 8 Any analysis of family and other
intimate associations-be it marriage or family businesses-will surely go
astray if it does not take "inclusive fitness" into account.
Third, on endogeneity: the survey data work best in those settings in
which individuals are not faced with any decisions. Nonetheless, surveys
are a very poor predictor of how they will behave when something,
anything, is on the line-that is, whenever individual efforts can make a
difference in the well-being of any individual. The current approaches to
happiness wrongly treat various human responses as though they were
exogenous reports of mental states. In most instances, these survey
responses, like individual behaviors, are better understood as endogenous:
they are intended to maximize some individual welfare in the face of a set
of negative external constraints that human ingenuity and effort cannot
change. Survey data are never exogenous. When people cannot change their
condition, they will report themselves happy in order to make themselves
happier. Why should they make themselves miserable when a bit of
6. See TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIM ERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND
HUMAN NATURE 127-30 (2001) (discussing how common genes lead to interdependent individual
utility functions whereby persons take into account the welfare of their genetic kin); Owen D. Jones et
al., Economics, Behavioral Biology, andLaw, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (providing a

recent exploration of the connections between evolution and economics).
7 Robert L. Trivers, Parent-OffspringConflict, 14 AMER. ZOOL. 249 (1974).
8 W.D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. ., 7 J. THEORETICAL
BIOL. 1 (1964).
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optimism will help their situation? When people can make themselves
better, they will push hard to get whatever it is that will improve them,
whether it be admission to a select college or access to needed medical care.
Now that there is a target, passivity is destructive, and with it goes the
contentment with the status quo.
Once these three elements are given their proper weight, the various
strands of the happiness literature fall into place. There is no need to
abandon the neoclassical model altogether when there are principled ways
to account for the observed deviations from its predictions. Quite the
opposite: once the richer account of human nature is taken into account, the
older, simpler regime proves more durable than before. The key feature to
take into account is not malevolence, but limited levels of altruism borne in
part from empathy.
Part IV briefly defends of the proposition that the new learning on
happiness does little to alter our understanding of the proper social
institutions.
I. Two MODELS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

The literature on happiness and the human emotions is subject to many
deep ambiguities, and perhaps none more salient than this: the happiness
literature largely relies upon use of surveys seeking to match overall
happiness against some social variable, such as income, health, crime rates,
and the like. 9 The survey data are collected scrupulously and all sorts of
sophisticated methodological checks are introduced to weed out false or
feigned answers to the particular questions asked. Yet, lo and behold,
when the dust settles, two counterintuitive conclusions dominate the
happiness literature. The first of these conclusions has to do with overall
changes in the larger culture. The second has to do with the importance of
relative happiness.
The initial finding is that only a few external factors can alter the
overall level of happiness for any person. The death of a spouse or other
loved one and serious and chronic pain are the most common examples, and
even the former is something that erodes with time. Most notably, even
permanent physical disability is said to correlate weakly with any decline in
happiness, on the ground that adaptive individuals learn to live within the
limitations of injury and disease.' 0 By and large, therefore, global measures
9. For a collection and review of much of this vast literature, see HELEN JOHNS & PAUL
ORMEROD, HAPPINESS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 28-38 (2007).
10. For a collection and review of this literature, see Cass Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J.
LEGAL STUD. S157, S158 (2008); DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 153 (2006).
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of happiness seem remarkably impervious to any change in the external
environment. People both report and experience approximately the same level
of happiness regardless of their social or personal well-being. The hedonic
losses that loom large to the outsider are always smaller than they appear."
The second conclusion deals with the relationship between absolute
and relative preferences. The standard neoclassical accounts of economics
suppose that envy has little to do with the level of satisfaction in life, so that
a person looks at his or her material and psychic well-being and cares little,
positively or negatively, about where they stand in relationships to other
persons. This account allows relatively strong forms of social comparisons
via the familiar tests for Pareto superiority and Pareto optimality. Thus, to
focus on the former, if A starts out with 10 and B with 20, A will be happy
with any new distribution that leaves his wealth greater than 10, while B
will be happy with any that leaves her wealth greater than 20. Neither side
compares with each other, so neither the ratio of their respective
endowments nor the absolute difference between them matters. If the initial
distribution is 10, 20, then any distribution Xa>10, Yb>2 0 counts as an
improvement for both X and Y.Neither envy nor empathy alters the wellbeing of either person. The argument, based on this neoclassical model,
easily generalizes to large numbers of people.
The second major conclusion of the happiness literature, however,
strongly disputes this assumption and holds that, except in extreme cases,
what matters to individuals is not their absolute position but their position
relative to some key reference group.' 2 All changes in the wealth of
persons have psychic externalities on the position of others. In principle,
the sign of that externality could go in either direction, such that the
increased wealth of others could affect either positively or negatively the
happiness level of any subject. However, the basic claim of the happiness
literature is that the externalities tend to run in one direction, so that
people regard themselves as worse off to the extent that their neighbors
have become better off, no matter whether they start out or end up richer
or poorer than their neighbor. The most striking version of this negative
interdependence is found in this old adage: "At the extreme we have the
11. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 10, at S157-58 ("[M]any losses are illusory or at least
exaggerated, in the sense that they inflict far less hedonic damage than people anticipate."); Samuel R.
Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L.
REv. 745, 749 (2007) ("Studies have consistently shown that non-disabled people rate the quality of
life with a disability as being significantly lower than people with disabilities rate the quality of their
own lives.").
12. See, e.g., Luis Rayo & Gary S. Becker, EvolutionaryEfficiency and Happiness, 115 J. POL.
ECON. 302, 303 (2007) (concluding that individuals care less about their absolute level of success and
more about their position relative to a social benchmark that changes over time).
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When God asks how he can
Russian peasant whose neighbour has a cow.
13
help, the peasant replies, 'Kill the cow.""
The one case that this theory does not quite address is the one in which
two people both start and end with the same endowments, so that a lockstep
increase for both produces no change in the absolute difference in their
wealth (which remains zero) or the ratio of their holdings (which remains
fixed at one). Maybe someone would concede that two people would both
prefer a situation where each had 20 to a situation where each had 10, even
though people with a generalized malice could easily prefer the former
distribution. But this example aside, there is at least some gain from
lockstep improvements. The more troublesome implication of the Russian
peasant maxim is that if someone else is better off, then I may perceive
myself as worse off when the absolute wealth of any other person increases,
regardless of what happens to me. Quite simply, we have a very new and
large class of negative externalities. Any increase of wealth by one person
has a negative impact on the well-being of all others. The harm principle of
John Stuart Mill has been taken to a new level whereby it becomes
14
impossible to find any action that does not offend the harm principle.
The detailed empirical literature, which relies heavily on survey
techniques, seems to suggest that these negative externalities are not the
product of some pathological condition, but the common stuff of ordinary
life. Thus, controlling for individual income, the empirical evidence
suggests that "higher earnings of neighbors are associated with lower levels
of self-reported happiness."' 5 This conclusion is not based on directly
asking individuals whether they are happier or sadder because of the
increased wealth of their neighbors. Rather, the conclusion is an inference,
not from revealed behavior, which is addressed later, but from census tract
studies which contain large amounts of information about how people
respond when measured against the actual wealth of others in whose midst
they live. It appears that there is a self-defeating quality to any form of
absolute improvement, in that it brings a person in contact with better-off

13.
14.

RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM ANEW SCIENCE 44-45 (2005).
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, reprinted in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 72-73 (Ernest Rhys ed., 1940) (1910). Mill explains:
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number,
is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.
Id.
15. See Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earningsand Well-Being, 102 Q.
J. ECON. 963, 963 (2005).
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individuals who become his new reference group, offsetting, at least in part,
any subjective gains 6the person received from improved wages and better
working conditions.
These two conclusions are in some tension with each other. If people
are largely indifferent to so many features of their external environment,
why do relative preferences loom so large in their own subjective
functions? And even if we put these internal tensions aside, the composite
portrait does not offer either an appealing or plausible view of human
nature. On the first point, the indifference proposition portrays people as far
too stoic given their inability to become happier with an objective, i.e.
resource-based, improvement in their external circumstances. On the
second, it portrays most people as far too envious, insofar as they think that
gains to other individuals within some reference group (e.g., a
neighborhood or workplace) produce negative utility for themselves. Thus,
they would prefer the status quo to a world in which someone is made
better while their material position is left unchanged. If the position is
correct, then it is very hard ever to find a Pareto improvement. In the
example above, suppose B's material holdings increase from 20 to 22, while
A's stay at 10. A is now worse off subjectively than before, given the
increase in the spread. Likewise, B would be subjectively worse off if A
increases from 10 to 12 while B's holding remains the same at 20, because
the decrease in the spread now has a negative impact on B, leaving the
befuddled empiricist struggling to find out which effect is the greater.
The analytical implications are odd, to say the least. The definition of
an externality becomes so broad as to be useless if any shift in relative
wealth between parties necessarily generates a negative externality.
Practically speaking, if most people internalize this norm, then we would
expect malicious behavior by individuals who would routinely be ready to
expend their own wealth with the sole object of making others poorer. After
all, A may well prefer the distribution of material resources that is 9:18 to
one that is 10:20, and may be thrilled if the distributions go from 10:20 to
6:0. Lose-lose transactions look to be the dominant pattern of social
behavior if envy or malice are the dominant human emotions.
One common thread in these two observations about human happiness
is that each observation is offered as a good reason to criticize the
assumptions of standard neoclassical economics with its preference for
competitive solutions whenever possible, coupled with broad and relatively
16. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?, 74 AM. ECON.
REv. 549, 570 (1984) (concluding that "a heterogeneous group of workers cannot coexist ... in the
absence of an array of compensating wage differentials that reflect the relative standing of each worker
in the income hierarchy of the group").
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flat taxes. But adopt these new assumptions, and the question of what form
of legal rules and institutions maximizes human welfare is now up for
grabs. The ubiquitous nature of the externalities makes it impossible to
support any conclusion about the proper distribution of wealth. If any
change produces abundant negative externalities, it would be hard to say
whether the world is better off with wealth compression or wealth
dispersions. Since the magnitude of these changes is uncertain, it is no
longer possible to adopt any model that starts with the assumption of
diminishing marginal utility of wealth, only to ask then whether the welfare
gains from greater equality offset any loss in productivity-which by itself
is a hard question to answer.
Before considering how these assumptions might operate, it is
instructive to ask this simple question: How well does this model stack up
against everyday observations about human behavior-the type of evidence
that is ignored when survey techniques take over? My contention is that as a
descriptive matter these assumptions do not fare very well, and that, as a
normative matter, they provide little guidance as to the proper form of
social organization. On both matters, we should pay greater attention to the
role of revealed preferences, which often leads us back to simpler solutions
that, by and large, ignore both these findings.
II. THE ROLE OF REVEALED PREFERENCES
The neoclassical model and evolutionary impulse each start with a
composite portrait of ordinary individuals in which the two strands of
happiness theory are woven together. The first one says that people's ability
to adapt psychologically to their current state of affairs suggests they have
little desire to change their current condition. The second issue, that of
relative position, suggests that one notable exception to that proposition is
that many individuals might be prepared to move down in terms of their
material satisfaction in order to gain status relative to their new reference
group. The one pattern of behavior that seems to be precluded by this model
is an effort to expend resources to improve (in absolute terms) one's
material and personal situation, except perhaps for status gains that could be
obtained more cheaply in other ways. The acquisitive nature of most
individuals most of the time seems to undermine the first of these
assumptions somewhat-the question is, to what degree.
The best point of departure is the standard neoclassical model that
places heavy reliance on the use of revealed preferences to evaluate
individual and group choices. This reliance starts from the proposition that
all self-interested individuals (including those who positively or negatively
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weigh the utilities of others in their own decision function) respond to
incentives, so that their actions depend on the options they choose in light
of their initial situation and the objectives they hope to achieve. Individuals
routinely calculate, at least in some rough-and-ready way, the value of each
of their options in order to pick the one that offers the highest expected
return to the individual or his or her reference group. These calculations
depend in part on the positive (or negative) affinities for other persons.
Parents may move into a neighborhood that has fewer restaurants and
theaters in order to live in one with better schools for their children. Persons
who have deep affection for other people may be willing to trade one (or
more) units of gain to one's self for one (or more) unit of gain for some
targeted individuals. Within the evolutionary framework, some ratios are
fixed by genetic connection: a parent is willing to sacrifice at the margin
one unit of personal gain for two units of gain to a child or sibling. The
sentiment of love suggests that these trade-offs exist between spouses,
although it is hard to predict the exact ratio for those trade-offs. Similar, but
larger, ratios apply to more remote relatives, like one-quarter for a first
cousin; and there may well be some positive, if weaker, interdependence of
utility between friends and employees. Remember, the Russian peasant was
only speaking of neighbors, not family and friends, or so we hope.
None of these private valuations, of course, are announced to the
external observer. So here is where the theory of revealed preferences cuts
in. We should not rely on verbal responses, or "cheap talk," which may not
reflect how people will act in real situations. The common practice of using
surveys to report general states of being at any point in time does not focus
on these choice issues, so neither incentives nor behaviors are at center
stage. The alternative approach is to try to infer the underlying preferences
by looking at the overt behavior in response to various opportunities and
challenges. Find out what an individual values by observing what he or she
seeks. Find out what he dislikes by observing what he avoids. All sorts of
speech that are not found in surveys can easily help determine these
preferences or give some clue as to their intensities. But actions, as it were,
speak louder than words when the two are in conflict. (The use of the
comparative reminds us not to conclude that the words do not matter at all,
for often they are used to explain why certain actions were taken, and in
settings where the wrong words can have disastrous consequences.) The
greater the effort (or movement) in either direction, ceterisparibus,the more
intense the preference. Just watch and you can learn a lot. Indeed, one
devastating characteristic of autistic people is that they cannot read the
behavioral cues of other individuals, so they suffer from an emotional isolation
that makes it exceedingly difficult for them to engage in social behavior.

HeinOnline -- 33 Vt. L. Rev. 568 2008-2009

2009]

Happinessand Revealed Preferences

It is just here where the emotions kick in with such strength.
Evolutionary theory predicts that these emotions will (on average) work to
advance the (inclusive) fitness of the individuals who have them. And so it
is that the desire to have more, not less, is driven by the simple imperative
that individuals, like other organisms, who command more real resourcesterritory, food, shelter, sexual access, and allies-will on average do better
over time than those who do not. Evolution thus looks as though it must
take into account absolute well-being, if not exclusively, then surely
extensively. Yet, to acquire these resources, individuals evince a set of
emotional attitudes consistent with the overt actions conducive to that end,
which is how integrated individuals behave virtually all of the time. The
objects of desire need not be money, and often are not, given that the needs
for reproductive success give rise to a wide range of desires, including
sexual desires, that are not easily reduced to cash but whose importance
should never be underestimated in the larger scheme of things. It is for that
reason that the language of everyday life has a rich vocabulary to describe,
for example, rage, lust, fear, greed, anger, grief, outrage, and
disappointment on the negative side, and contentment, sympathy, love,
tenderness, respect, and admiration on the positive.
Indeed, it is possible to go further and insist that in evolutionary terms
happiness is not always a winner; it is often a loser. On the former,
happiness surely is positively correlated with well-being when it does not
conflict with the interests of other individuals to whom a person is tied by
blood, marriage, or friendship. A person who gets a raise or feels happy is,
ceteris paribus, in a better position to do something for those for whom he
or she has positive attachments. Hence in relationships with third persons
where there are no conflicts among members of the "in" group, anything
that improves wealth or happiness for the one is likely to be shared by
others in rough proportion to the closeness of the relationship. It is also
likely to generate affirmative responses from others in the group, all of
whom have some reason to be pleased by the positive nature of the external
connection which redounds to their material benefit.
These calculations on happiness, however, change radically when there
are real conflicts between members of an affinity group. Thus, take the
simplest case of a parent who has to care for a sick child. A person who is
only concerned about his own happiness is likely to bail out on the child,
whose life prospects thereafter diminish severely, especially in human
beings, which are slow to reach self-sufficiency. Happiness in this context
is a losing emotion because it precludes any sacrifice of parental well-being
in situations where children need their help the most. Thus, parents should
not report that they happily take care of sick children at some real cost to
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their own well-being, or that they are happy when their children get better.
At this point the appropriate set of emotional sensibilities include worry,
concern, anxiety, relief, gratitude, and affection, all of which lead parents to
make the needed sacrifices for their children. It is therefore no accident that
parents who are struggling with difficult children report a lower level of
happiness than those who have no children, at least for the short term, even
if they have longer lifetime satisfactions. 7 Clearly, the most sensible way to
interpret this information in evolutionary terms is that the short-term
expenditures yield powerful long-term payoffs to all concerned. We are
programmed to take care of children, and although many people resist the
temptation, those who walk down that path usually exhibit the emotions
described above. That result is, of course, not usual, because given natural
variation in populations, we should expect some, but not many, cases of
abuse, neglect, or even abandonment, all of which should make our
empathetic emotions should start to shudder.
Similar arguments can be made for the care and mutual concern that is
given among children, or by children to parents, both as to the central
tendencies and the occasional outliers. Behaviorally, of course, these
situations do not typically show the level of flat-out determination that is
found in the case of parent and child. But the explanations for these diverse
outcomes all arise from within the theory, not from outside of it. Recall that
the key ratio is one unit of cost to the actor must generate two units of gain
to the recipient in order for actions to be in evolutionary equilibrium. These
costs and benefits vary across settings. The simplest observational truth is
that this ratio is commonly exceeded when competent parents take care of
helpless infants. But that ratio shifts as the children become more selfsufficient. Likewise, in most situations, siblings, when young, are less able
to provide the kind of support that parents can and do supply. The level of
cooperative behavior is lower, because the opportunities are so different,
not because the basic ratios change. And put people in crisis situations,
where siblings must substitute because the parents are not there, and the
behavior will quickly change as well.
In the face of these complex human interactions, any attempt to make
the standard Benthamite maneuver of reducing all these emotional states to
a single notion of happiness or utility surely falsifies every subjective
rendering of ordinary experience.' 8 Happiness cannot be the sole measure if
17. For details on these findings see GILBERT, supranote 10, at 221.
18. On this point at least, I am at one with Martha Nussbaum. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Who
Is the Happy Warrior?Philosophy Poses Questions to Psychology, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S81, S83 (2008)
("Pleasures can vary in intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquicy or remoteness, and,
finally, in causal properties (tendency to produce more pleasure, and so on).").
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human beings are to survive over time. We were in some sense born to
suffer and sacrifice. And this imperative does not start with people, but is
inbred in just about every other sentient creature, just as Justinian said (if
for all the wrong reasons). 19 In making this point, I am not urging a strong
view of incommensurability across emotions, if that means that people find
themselves unable to make decisions when two strong sentiments collide. E0
Quite the opposite, the evolutionary case cuts against any claim of
incommensurability precisely because people are already programmed
genetically to take into account the welfare of others and typically cannot
ignore the welfare of other individuals. The behavior that works so well
within families, moreover, encourages the formation of various alliances
with outsiders given, as the experimental literature shows, the high rates of
return to cooperative behavior, even if there is no assurance of reciprocal
performance.2 1 Those who have the instinct and can find each other will do
far better than those who lack it utterly.
As evidence for this proposition, simple observation shows that most
integrated people make intrafamilial trade-offs fairly easily precisely
because their utility functions are so well-defined. Of course, everyone
will have genuine difficulties that are closer to the line, but that is not a
distinctive feature of interactive or cooperative behavior. There are likely
to be hard cases in any continuous distribution, for even the simplest
expected utility models can generate close outcomes in high-stakes
situations. In making these trade-offs, few people gravitate wholly to one
extreme. It is not as though work always trumps family, or the reverse. It
is only that for most people the internal conflicts can be reduced to
manageable levels, most of the time. On this score, therefore, the
fascination with aggregate survey data should not overlook the sad but
powerful truth that some people do fall apart so badly from a combination
of disease and ill fortune that they cannot participate in any surveys.
Indeed, one feature of all the survey data is that it leaves to one side the
serious cases of emotional and psychological breakdown that are all too
common in any social setting.

19. See JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES, supra note 5, § 1.2. "The law of nature is the law instilled by
nature in all creatures. It is not merely for mankind but for all creatures of the sky, earth and sea." Id.
20. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of
the World?, 3 UTAH L. REV. 683, 686-87 (1995) (discussing how people routinely trade
incommensurables in making personal decisions).
21. For a full discussion, see infra note 31 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 33 Vt. L. Rev. 571 2008-2009

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 33:559

III. EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND COMMON SENSE

The analysis of evolutionary forces suggests that the new data offers a
poor account of human behavior even if we put to one side the complexities
introduced by inclusive fitness. Let us begin with the first point: that most
people are largely indifferent to wealth and material well-being, which is
implicit in the assertion that happiness over time is largely invariant to the
increases in national wealth or crime levels, as the data suggest. The first
observation here is that people take strong steps to protect their interests as
they perceive them. Anyone who has done a day of work in administration
or personnel will treat these platitudes as self-evident truths. People feel
very strongly when they think they are underpaid or have been treated
unjustly. These people both voice and act on these complaints. (Their talk is
not cheap, as it often represents an attempt to win supporters, gain allies,
squash the opposition, or get the boss into hot water.) Most people are quite
nervous about asking for salary increases but they are often visibly upset
when they do not receive raises. The concern with working conditions,
travel reimbursements, fringe benefits, and promotion prospects do not
reflect a stoic indifference to external circumstances. Instead, these
concerns are borne of individuals' complete confidence in their ability to
adapt to changes in their financial or physical well-being.
And why would they be indifferent? Relative status is surely a part of
this concern, but usually in a specialized way. First, standing alone, relative
incomes are not a source of resentment, at least in a well-run firm.
Secretaries do not expect to make as much as their bosses. The resentments
only kick in during good times, when their superiors hog all the gain and do
not pass down any fraction of it to lower-level employees. These employees
expect not parity but consideration. Envy is a corrosive attitude in any
workplace, and the first job of any manager is to maintain a supportive
culture with high morale. No major professional establishment could
achieve these key objectives if large disparities in income were enough to
trigger status resentments.
The problem of relative wages becomes much more ticklish when
comparisons are made between individuals who are in the same work
cohort. When team production is required, tension can easily flare up when
a diligent employee wants to take measures to resist the slacker getting paid
for work performed by the diligent employee. In many cases, the question
of who has performed well adds another layer of complexity to the issue.
However, this determination does not negate the point that employers in
well-run firms have to make sure that wage and salary levels do not build in
or preserve indefensible cross-subsidies between workers: the party who
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pays the subsidy is far more likely to quit than the worker who receives it.
Here, status concerns are intimately tied with what is rightly termed a theft
of labor, which people should be worried about under the standard
neoclassical framework.22
One cannot easily explain this phenomenon by assuming that employee
agitation is confined to those individuals who have never gone through the
bootless process of getting a raise only to find that it does nothing to improve
their quality of life. Individuals are constantly seeking new jobs to achieve
some mix of higher wages and better working conditions. Nor is this agitation
confined only to people with limited incomes for whom the money might
really make a difference. Whatever one thinks about the diminishing
marginal utility of money, we commonly see actors and athletes negotiating
hard, at a real cost in time, emotion, and money, for that last million dollars.
Because leisure is always an option, it is hard to reconcile this form of
aggressive behavior with the view that people are indifferent to wealth. Nor
does it seem credible that the sole driver of this acquisitive conduct is the
effort to improve one's relative position in a given reference group. People
tend to like money, all else being equal. Individuals are often determined to
move up from lower-status occupations to higher-status occupations, even if
these changes mean that they knowingly decline in status relative to their new
peer groups. Indeed, virtually no one decides to take a cut in pay or a
demotion in order to gain a higher relative ranking in some low-status field.
Nor should we think that there is any magic in the commonplace observation
that happiness does not always increase with wealth. We should expect
people forced to work long hours in hostile situations to demand a wage
premium for their efforts. For these workers, their basic position increases
with overall social wealth because they can command a higher wage for the
same level of personal privation. The model depicts constant adjustment at
the margin, not one of relative indifference.
This model also applies to housing. If people were indifferent to their
external circumstances, then why do they work so hard to scrape together
a down payment to move to a better neighborhood? And how many
people who can afford to live where they presently do move to a more
dangerous neighborhood-remember, the survey data show a remarkable
indifference towards level of criminal activity23-in order to improve their
relative status? No detailed study is required to confirm that people are
22. For a perceptive account of how these differences work, see TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY
WAGES DON'T FALL DURING A RECESSION 310 (1999) (explaining the asymmetry between increases

and decreases in starting pay).
23. See JOHNS & ORMEROD, supra note 9, at 36 (stating that increased crime in European
countries and the United States "does not seem to have had any discernible negative effect on happiness").
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always looking to move to better neighborhoods that they can afford or
that people welcome neighbors whose addition to the neighborhood will
make their lives better, or that people are seeking to raise zoning and other
barriers to keep out those whom they do not want. The amount of
agitation surrounding land use decisions before zoning boards is evidence
of the degree to which people are sensitive to these decisions.
The most instructive example of the lack of external indifference is
health. On this point the evidence is quite striking. One happiness study
suggests that people undergoing dialysis are not particularly unhappy relative
to others, as they learn to adapt to their condition. Do not believe it for a
second. There is an evident tension between the theory of revealed
preferences and the happiness literature. On the medical side, no one disputes
the dreadful quality of life for patients on dialysis, 24 whose life expectancy is
approximately four or five years from the onset of treatment.25 The happiness
literature suggests that the mental well-being of people on dialysis does not
decline as much as healthy individuals expect.26 But the observed pattern of
behavior tells a different story, for other studies report a far higher rate of
depression and other psychological disorders among dialysis patients. More
emphatically, the rate of suicides among dialysis patients is estimated to be
one hundred times that of the normal population.27 In addition, as much as
twenty-five percent of deaths among individuals on dialysis result from
withdrawal from treatment, usually in older patients with other complications. 8 Here the behavior tells a more accurate story than the surveys.
24. For one stark account, see Benjamin Hippen, The Case for Kidney Markets, 14 NEW
ATLANTIS 47, 48 (2006), available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-case-for-kidneymarkets (explaining the daily hardships endured by dialysis patients).
25. Almost half of the dialysis population is over sixty-five years old. U.S. Renal Data Sys.,
2006
Annual Data Report Reference Tables
112 tbl.D. 11
(2006), available at
http://www.usrds.org/reference.htm. The majority of those patients will die within five years after
starting dialysis. Id. at 298 tbl.I.4, 300 tbl.l.6, 301 tbl.I.7 (2006).
26. Jason Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study Using
EcologicalMomentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 3 (2005).
27. Katherine T. Kelly & Mark P. Knudson, Are No-Suicide ContractsEffective in Preventing
Suicide Patients Seen by Primary Care Physicians?, 9 ARCHIVES OF FAM. MED 1119, 1119 (2000),
available at http://archfami.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/9/1l 119.pdf.
28. See Lewis M. Cohen et al., PracticalConsiderationsin Dialysis Withdrawal, 289 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 2113, 2114 (2003) (indicating that ESRD affects mainly the severely ill and geriatric population); Lionel
U. Mailloux et al., Death by Withdrawalfrom Dialysis: A 20-Year Clinical Experience, 3 J. AM. Soc'Y
NEPHROLOGY 1631, 1636 (1993) (stating that "withdrawal from dialysis may be a common cause of death,
especially in the older patients with the more serious renal diagnosis of diabetes mellitus and renal vascular
disease"). Needless to say these figures have to be taken with care. People on dialysis suffer from painful or
debilitating conditions, such as advanced diabetes, which might prompt the withdrawal. Michael J. McCarthy,
The Choice: Years on Dialysis Brought Joe Mole to a Cross Roads, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2005, at Al. For my
critique of the statistical analysis, see Richard A. Epstein, Altruism and Valuable Considerationin Organ
Transplantation,in WHY ALTRUISM ISNOT ENOUGH 79, 88-89 (Sally Satel, ed. 2008).
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The same is true for less dramatic conditions. If individuals were
resigned to adapt to their injuries, then what explains the enormous level of
public resources and private effort that goes into physical therapy and other
types of rehabilitation from various kinds of diseases and injuries? 29 Not
only do athletes undergo these treatments, but so do millions of people from
all walks of life who seek, with both cash and labor, to recover some
element of their lost function. If they can adapt to the conditions gracefully,
then why would they make themselves poorer? Because the differences
matter. Any sense of stoic indifference compromises their survival instinct.
So what then do we make of the surveys on this point? Here
evolutionary theory explains why some individuals opt for constant work
towards improvement and others express quiescence at their respective
state. Let us assume that we have crippled individuals for whom nothing
else can be done. They may be forced to live the rest of their lives in a
wheelchair, or they may suffer from some serious personal disorder. At this
point of prognosis, the survival instincts have to adjust to the fact that no
amount of effort will alter the condition in question. So now the emotions
act endogenously. Self-deception becomes a survival mechanism. In order
to improve the quality and length of their lives, it is important for these
individuals to will themselves into a state of happiness. If they get gloomy
and morose, it will negatively impact everything from appetite to
circulation. Feeling happy and content is now the best survival strategy. In
some cases, this feeling of happiness is so internalized that individuals
come to believe what they say, even as those around them cannot believe
them. That is why people go out of their way to "cheer up" their less
fortunate friends. But if some possibility of a cure comes forward,
quiescence is no longer the optimal strategy. So long as there are some
options that promise a chance of improvement, we should expect people to
expend enormous resources to get the preferred treatment. This is exactly
what people do when using potent off-label drugs or enrolling in cancer
trials that offer some prospect of remission. People do so even at some very
high cost in terms of short-term pain. And if by some miracle scientists
could with certainty reverse paralysis by mending the spinal cord, does any
empirical economist think that most, or even any, paraplegics or
quadriplegics who have announced themselves happy in their stricken
29. For recent figures on health spending, see U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.
CMS, National Health Expenditure Projections 2007-2017, http://www.cms.hbs.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/proj2007.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). For example, "[a]s a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), health care spending is projected to increase to 16.3
percent in 2007 from 16.0 percent in 2006. By the end of the projection period, health care spending in
the United States is expected to ... comprise 19.5 percent of GDP." Id.
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conditions would sit contentedly by? No way. Every one, regardless of
wealth or social station, would move heaven and earth to get that magic
elixir as quickly as possible. At this point quiescence no longer has survival
value, and therefore the emotions will quickly change to deal with
necessities at hand. The survey data are correct in what they report. But this
data is misinterpreted. Put a cure on the table and the people who were
content with their lot yesterday will move heaven and earth tomorrow.
Once cured, these individuals frequently block out their past conditions,
which is what happens with most individuals who have endured severe
torture or privation. Ask people who have recovered from serious illnesses,
whether they dwell on their conditions once they have passed. They do not
because doing so does not help them in living life going forward. They had
to learn to laugh and be cheerful when they had the condition, for
otherwise, they might not have lived through it at all.
A second major finding of the happiness literature is that individuals
often feel better when their material conditions improve relative to those of
others. 30 Hence, the finding is that people are less happy when they are
among the poorer individuals in their neighborhoods. Once again my
arguments about revealed preferences suggest that this finding is seriously
incomplete. People have all sorts of residential choices and rarely do we see
anyone striving mightily to have the highest income in a neighborhood that
is less attractive and less safe than their current neighborhood. The issues
associated with residential sorting are complex, but, if anything, general
theoretical considerations suggest that people will tend to move into
neighborhoods with other people who are pretty much like themselves.
They do not move into places where they stand out as having the greatest
wealth and, hence, the highest status.
The point can be demonstrated by looking at the sorting mechanisms
used to determine membership in voluntary residential groupings, such as
planned unit developments, cooperatives, or condominiums. All of these
voluntary associations have rules to restrict the entry of new arrivals, which
vary with the type of organization in question. The checks run by co-op
boards, for example, are not to ensure that the new arrivals are poorer than
the others so as to boost the status of those who already live there. Instead,
these checks are chiefly to determine whether the new arrivals can carry
their share of the debt load and will comport themselves in ways that do not
disturb the tranquility of their neighbors. This sorting mechanism is not
perpetually out of equilibrium, with people constantly seeking to be at the
30. See, e.g., Rayo & Becker, supra note 12, at 303 ("[Tlhe level of happiness that an
individual derives from his economic success is usually affected by the success of his peers ... ").
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top of some smaller heap than the one where they currently sit. The
dominant trend is precisely the opposite way. These institutions, like public
neighborhoods, all provide a mix of private and common elements. The
house or apartment is the former. The grounds, the hallways, and the
meeting rooms are the latter. Managing these common elements requires
some form of legal framework so that the majority cannot vote out the
minority or otherwise make them bear the sole, or even disproportionate,
levels of common expenses. The usual framework is one whereby the
majority may set the rules of the game, so long as there is no explicit
discrimination against the minority.
Public law imposes similar obligations on taxing authorities. Giving
substance to this rule is not easy, as it applies to both financial and
nonfinancial obligations. Even an ideal set of rules can only do so much
good, for much depends on the characteristics of the group members. Any
decisions based on these rules will work better if there is a high level of
homogeneity among group members, so that the choices of the group
members will tend to converge in ways that reduce the pressure on any
collective decision mechanism. On matters of wealth, therefore, one tends
to see individuals join these common living situations with other people of
comparable wealth. One also tends to see this trend in open-access
neighborhoods. Most people typically want the last dollar they spend on
private homes and public amenities to be of equal value. Otherwise they
could make themselves better off by increasing one type of expenditure at
the expense of the other. Therefore, one reason not to live in a common-unit
development where people are richer than you is that you will be forced to
overspend relative to your perceived tastes. So, it is better not to join at
all, or to leave, if the local environment has become too rich for your own
blood. Similarly, at the other end, people who are too rich relative to the
mean will be forced to underspend on these common amenities, so they
will tend to move out as well. Ditto with neighborhoods, which tend to be
more diverse on all these measures, because neighborhoods lack any
legally defined boundaries or legal mechanism for exclusion. Generally
speaking, we should predict that powerful forces will incline most
individuals to aim toward the middle of the wealth distribution, which will
produce a reduction of the variance that in turn reduces the stress on
governance. Transaction costs, not to mention rent control, can impede the
realignment of people. And some individuals may find it difficult to move
because of age or health. But the centralizing tendency is to move toward
the middle, instead of not locating in neighborhoods where you sit at the
top of the pack.
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Wealth, of course, is not the only variable that matters. One typical
problem for both common-unit developments and neighborhoods involves
matters of lifestyle, on which it is possible to have a high variance. But
even here, variations in taste on dining and recreation are likely to be
weaker among individuals at the same income or wealth level-meaning
that people are more likely to find friends among their neighbors with a
slighter variation in income or wealth. But on many matters, the effects
may be less pronounced because no uniform rule requires that all
individuals prefer people who are similar to, or different from,
themselves. But on balance salient similarities matter. Many common
facilities include old-age homes, some of which are organized on religious
lines, or cater to retirees, or welcome children or golfers. Many forms of
racial or ethnic separation may also be (benignly) explained along these
lines. 3' A common interest along any of these dimensions reduces the
stresses on collective decision making. The sorting mechanism thus
reduces stress on the governance structures. There is no inertia here, nor
any evident desire to be at the top of the heap.
But let us assume that status matters to some, as it surely does. Given
the natural level of variation in any population, status need not matter to all,
or even to most. Some individuals are ostentatious about how they spend
their cash; others live understated lives so as not to draw attention to their
wealth. The variation in responses to wealth, like the variation in any other
taste or temperament, is a constant feature of human life. Some people care
about status more than others. Some do not care about it at all. Some people
want their names brought to light when they make charitable contributions.
Others prefer to give anonymously. Teasing out the relative levels is very
hard to do.
In the midst of this confusion, however, one point does seem clear.
From an evolutionary point of view, any preoccupation with social status is
a loser from the perspective of inclusive fitness. To be sure, hating those
individuals who pose a threat to your well-being may make sense, because
now one invests in resources to ensure that his or her absolute position does
not deteriorate as a function of what other individuals do. The hatred of
those who pose a threat to physical safety comes at the top of the list, for
weaker persons are always more vulnerable to attacks from countless
different sources. And much ethnic and racial conflict stems from the
obvious fear that persons of other groups are willing to hurt or destroy
individuals with whom they have few genetic or affective ties. Inclusive
31: See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION LAWS 61-69 (1992) (explaining "[c]ollective [c]hoice within [g]roups").

HeinOnline -- 33 Vt. L. Rev. 578 2008-2009

2009]

Happiness and Revealed Preferences

fitness in this context can worsen an already-explosive situation.
Individuals who care about their own families will be prepared to invest
more resources to attack outsiders than those who care only about
themselves, because they now rightly perceive that they have more to lose
from the incursion. Altruism, in a word, is often selective, not universal, in
its objects. 3' As such, selective criticism can intensify conflicts, not
ameliorate them.
Indeed, understanding why many individuals develop deep
antagonisms toward business competitors is made easier given the threat
that lower prices and better goods-aside from any possibility of unfair
competition by force or fraud-pose to their own well-being. The social
conclusion to offer protection against force but not competition-so central
to the classical liberal project--does not stem from the observation that
competition does not hurt, because it surely does. Rather, it stems from the
intellectual conviction, which only human beings can develop, that
competition leads to a positive-sum outcome that improves overall social
welfare relative to the protectionist mentality that gives an incumbent
protection against new entrants, to the great detriment of consumers. (One
reason why force and competition operate so differently is that force by A
against B reduces the opportunity set of all Cs, whereas competition by A
against B increases the overall welfare.) One defending markets is always in
a fragile position precisely because many individuals in the face of severe
personal or in-group dislocation want to think that they are entitled to
protection or redress from economic harms, regardless of the effect that
such protection would have on the overall system.
Yet even after these risks are recognized, the one set of emotions that
has no evolutionary pedigree is simple envy toward other individuals whose
improvement in position poses neither a physical nor competitive threat. In
these cases, this form of envy leads people to invest in making others
poorer, which in turn means that they have fewer resources to devote to
activities that improve their material well-being, or to protect themselves
against others who do pose such threats. A's act of malice against B could
easily expose A to risk or require the expenditure of resources that weaken
A for any future dispute with C. A more empathetic response has a far more
positive rate of return. Welcome the new wealthy neighbors into the
neighborhood because they generate positive externalities to diffuse
populations that are difficult to purchase but valuable to have. One
dominant feature in all legal systems is to afford strong protection against
32. See Richard A. Epstein, Altruism: Universal and Selective, 67 Soc. SERV. REV. 388, 404
(1993) (stating that "[s]elective altruism may prove more powerful than universal altruism" and more
dangerous insofar as it encourages people to hurt strangers in order to benefit members of their in-group).
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negative externalities through the law of trespass and nuisance, but little if
any restitution for positive externalities conferred on neighbors." But that
conclusion does not depend on any peculiar judgment that these positive
externalities do not matter, for manifestly they do in both the value of real
property and the enjoyment of life. Rather, the reluctance to offer legal
protection to positive externalities stems from the correct perception that
remedies via private actions are ultimately unworkable. The number of
physical invasions tends to be small, localized, and easily identifiable.
(And, for those that are not, some collective system of pollution controls
will work better anyhow.) The set of external benefits from fixing
drainpipes, painting shutters, and mowing lawns are so numerous that all
landowners are better off to avoid expensive and divisive litigation by
relying instead on a mix of informal social sanctions, such as frowning at
the neighbor who does not clear his walk, or other legal mechanisms, such
as zoning, in both its good and bad guises.
That said, envy has no survival value at all if it reduces the level of
indirect benefits that individuals are able to garner for themselves for free.
Indeed, the key element in a neighborhood is to develop informal norms of
reciprocity so that all local people invest more resources in keeping their
own premises neat and tidy, secure in the knowledge that others have done,
and will continue to do, the same. These norms of reciprocity and
cooperation, even among strangers, suggest that far from wanting to see
their neighbors worse off, most people are willing to practice and encourage
unilateral actions that only make sense from a personal point of view if
other persons reciprocate even when they are not under any legal
compulsion to do so. The extreme versions of rational-choice theory assume
that all individuals will act selfishly in any prisoner's-dilemma situation, by
keeping the benefits that others supply while supplying none themselves.
But that somber conclusion about the ubiquity of the prisoner's-dilemma
game does not square with the common observation that neighbors often
take the first step to establish good relations, even when there is no strict
obligation to reciprocate.
That moderately optimistic view has, moreover, been confirmed in the
experimental setting. One recent experiment looked at a variety of contexts
in which individuals who did not know each other were given a fixed
amount of wealth and told that they could keep it all for themselves, or put
some fraction of it in a pool in which they would be one of four members,
33. On this theme, see Ariel Porat, Expanding Restitution: Liabilityfor UnrequestedBenefits
(Tel Aviv Univ. Legal Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 85, 2008), available at
http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/fp/art85 (outlining the case for generally allowing restitution for
unsolicited benefits).
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each of whom would receive back $4 for each $10 that the experimental
subject put in. 34 The upshot was that any social contribution produced a net
increment of $6 to the group as a whole, but a net loss of $6 to each
contributor.35 But the zero level of contributions did not materialize.36
Instead, most individuals contributed some portion of their wealth to the
common pool in the expectation that others would do the same, which
usually happened.37 Indeed, any one individual will be better off with
contributions if on average the other three contributed more than fifty
percent of the time. These experiments were done with anonymous
persons 38 in which there was no opportunity to use gentle social sanctions to
improve the level of participation, unlike neighborhood settings in which
the failure to keep up one's own premises is apparent to all. Indeed, far
from having a free ride as its end, sociability among many individuals goes
further. Some people are willing to enforce social norms against violators,
at some net cost to themselves, as by chastising individuals who litter in
parks or who smoke in airports or, especially, elevators. The arguments that
people's happiness is positively correlated with the misfortunes of others
has little general traction.
To be sure, consistent with heterogeneity, these results are not uniform
in all places or for all people. But, strikingly, the findings strongly suggest
that in a well-integrated society, most of the efforts at voluntary discipline
were by individuals who sought to punish negative deviations from social
standards.3 9 In places such as Boston and Melbourne, the ratios were
overwhelmingly favorable, for example, while in other places such as
Athens and Muscat, the punishment was frequently administered by
individuals who wished to enforce their own antisocial behavior. 40 This
suggests that the social equilibria can be quite fragile, almost along the lines
of the tit-for-tat response to avoid the prisoner's-dilemma game: cooperate
first until someone else defects. 4' These games are not played in isolation,
of course, so there is good reason to think that others can reinforce positive
behavior through such simple but powerful devices as reputation. The
34. See Herbert Gintis, Punishment and Cooperation, 319 SCIENCE 1345, 1345 (2008)
(reporting on Benedikt Herrmann et at., Antisocial Punishment Across Societies, 319 SCIENCE 1362
(2008) and explaining a "public goods game" employed by the authors of that article).
35. Herrmann et al., supra note 34, at 1364.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1363.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1364.
41. For the many complexities, see, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF
COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 20-22 (1997).
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effectiveness of these devices is often overlooked, and they should never be
taken for granted. But most neighbors interact on systems that involve a
live-and-let-live strategy for small negative reciprocal interactions coupled
with some positive assistance on a consistent and ongoing basis. None of
these observations seem remotely consistent with the view that one's
primary goal is to gain status relative to one's neighbors.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL THEORY

The new emphasis on the study of happiness and emotions is often
portrayed as reason to think differently about how social interactions ought
to take place, but it hardly seems to meet that objective. Initially, of course,
this new emphasis says nothing about innovation and wealth generation.
Social mechanisms that produce innovation and wealth generation in a
world where happiness and emotions are ignored are as likely to work well
in a world in which these factors are systematically taken into account.
There is no reason to think that we should prefer monopoly to competition
in organizing the means of production, or that we should think that the case
for the regulation of natural monopoly is either strengthened or weakened
by an awareness of the many features that might influence human happiness
and well-being. In general, more is still better. And for those who doubt it,
one need only propose that individuals roll back the clock one hundred
years to an age where death by disease and accident was more common,
income levels were a fraction of what they are today, and hard labor was a
fact of life for most individuals. And then just try to persuade people that
nothing is lost by this maneuver because the survey data show that the
current set of institutions and technologies has resulted in some kind of an
arms race in which everyone is left exactly where they were before, at huge
expenditures of wealth. The constant concern with poverty, or with the
insecurities of the middle class, or with the anxieties of globalization make
it clear that this program will resonate with no portion of the overall
population. Do we really think that high status persons would rather die at
fifty so long as the lesser mortals died at forty than to have a world in which
the life expectancy and general health of all groups move up smartly, where
the necessary consequence is to narrow the gaps in longevity and health
between the top and bottom of the population?
Nor does this literature even tell us much about the questions of
redistribution of income or wealth. If happiness is not dependent on
increases in wealth, the poor should be happy with their lot. If any change
in relative wealth has status effects, positive or negative, on different
groups, who can sort out which set of the externalities is larger than the
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other? The safe approach in these cases is to ignore all the fine points about
relative preferences in order to concentrate on overall increases in
productivity. If redistribution is defensible, then it is on the ground that the
last dollar means more to a poor person than to a rich one, which is not to
say that the rich do not suffer something when forced to make these
payments, or that any losses in overall wealth are necessarily offset by the
results of a more equitable equilibrium. There is, in short, good reason that
for thousands of years virtually everyone who thought about the rules that
governed a society paid no attention to the vagaries of individual happiness
or to survey data. The best that we can do collectively is to follow the old
program that says aggression, "no," cooperation, "yes," within a framework
of stable social institutions. Let these be handled, and in the end, it is far
more likely that the gains from improved production and innovation will
swamp any efforts to remake the legal and social system to respond to the
new learning contained in the happiness literature.
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